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Abstract This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the
wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regula-
tions on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations ro-
bustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number
of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements
are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the nega-
tive impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical
analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that cor-
ruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’
effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results
thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Recent work by Méon and Sekkat (2005) and Méon and Weill (2010) stresses the potential
importance of corruption in ‘greasing the wheels’ of an economy. In this paper we follow
their agenda and analyze whether and to what extent corruption—as one key feature of a
country’s institutional quality—affects the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship. The
question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy has frequently been
investigated in the context of economic growth. Routine corruption may well be efficiency
enhancing. As Leff (1964: 11) states: “If the government has erred in its decision, the course
made possible by corruption may well be the better one.” Corruption may also ‘grease the
wheels’ in rigid public administrations. As Huntington (1968: 386) notes: “In terms of eco-
nomic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized, dishonest
bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy.” Corruption might be
a means of achieving certain benefits that make work in the official economy easier, such
as winning a contract from a public authority, getting a licence (e.g., for operating taxis
or providing other services, or getting permission to convert land into “construction ready”
land). However, the majority of the cross-country literature finds no evidence in favor of the
greasing the wheels hypothesis, as Campos et al. (2010) show using meta-analysis.1
Arguably, while it might be difficult to find that corruption increases economic growth
overall, focusing instead on market entry might change the verdict. This is because the effect
is directly observable for a smaller unit of observation. In a recent paper, Vial and Hanoteau
(2010) do indeed find empirical evidence supporting the greasing the wheels effect, using
micro-level data on Indonesian firms which allows for the measurement of corruption and
growth at the plant level.
In this paper we take an intermediate approach between the macroeconomic corruption
and growth studies and the microeconomic single country studies. We analyze empirically
whether corruption affects the impact of strict regulations on entrepreneurial activity at the
international level. This means we will be taking a macro-perspective but stop short of test-
ing an economy-wide growth effect. As our measures of corruption we employ two datasets
provided by Transparency International and the World Bank, respectively. Data on regula-
tion are taken from the World Bank’s Doing Business Database and the Economic Freedom
Index developed by the Fraser Institute.
While the impact of strict regulations on entrepreneurial activity has been the subject
of previous research, the hypotheses have mostly been tested in an ad hoc manner—using
models which lack potentially relevant control variables, most likely implying biased results.
In depth tests for robustness are also lacking. With this in mind, prior to analyzing our
main question, we develop a robust empirical model for the determinants of entrepreneurial
activity. Specifically, we employ extreme bounds analysis (EBA) as proposed by Leamer
(1983), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for a panel of 43 countries over
the 2003–2005 period to identify the variables which are robust. Being instrumental to the
main question, the analysis fills a gap in the literature in its own right.
1Mauro (1998), for example, investigates the impact of corruption on economic growth for separate samples
of high and low red tape countries. His results show no evidence in favor of a beneficial effect of corruption.
Méon and Sekkat (2005) find some evidence that corruption even sands the wheels of the system (instead
of greasing them). Specifically, Méon and Sekkat show that the negative impact of corruption on economic
growth becomes worse when indicators of the quality of governance deteriorate.
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To foreshadow the results of our analysis, we find that, on average, more procedures
required to start a business and larger minimum capital requirements robustly reduce the
number of entrepreneurs entering the market. However, corruption seems to reduce the neg-
ative impact of regulations on firm entry. This means that we find evidence in favor of the
‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.
We proceed as follows. The next section develops our main hypothesis on the interaction
between regulations and corruption, while our data are described in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, we
test whether regulations robustly affect firm entry; Sect. 5 tests our main hypothesis. The
final section concludes the paper.
2 The hypothesis
According to public choice theory, special interest groups benefit from particular govern-
ment actions, albeit at the cost of overall efficiency and well-being (Stigler 1971). As the
individual benefits for each member of a small special interest lobbying group are sub-
stantial, whereas the costs to the average member of society are rather small, governments
become larger and larger as politicians maximize their re-election possibilities by catering
to powerful special interests. According to classical economic theory, on the contrary, the
state remedies market failures by producing important public goods (Musgrave 1959), levy-
ing Pigouvian taxes (Pigou 1928) and providing institutional frameworks, without which the
markets would not work efficiently or even function at all (Blankart 2003). According to the
public choice view, regulation is acquired by industries and designed for their benefit, while
the public interest perspective implies that regulation is required to reduce inefficiencies and
achieve socially optimal outcomes.
Arguably, depending on one’s view of the purposes and effects of regulatory intervention,
it can either be beneficial or harmful and, consequently, ways to overcome these regulations
may or may not be welcome. Clearly, one way to circumvent regulation is by bribing offi-
cials. In corrupt countries, officials can easily be bribed to issue permits, potentially facilitat-
ing entrepreneurial activity and, in particular, firm entry into the official market. Corruption
might be seen as increasing the ‘speed of money’, which considerably reduces slow-moving
queues in public offices, for example.
The ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis features prominently in the early literature on the ef-
fects of corruption (e.g., Leff 1964; Leys 1965; Huntington 1968). Beck and Mahler (1986)
and Lien (1986) also proposed that corruption increases efficiency. Nye (1967) argues that
corruption might be a way to overcome discrimination against members of a minority group,
which could actually prevent entrepreneurs from accessing markets. This is because ineffi-
cient regulations constitute an impediment to investment that can be overcome by bribing
bureaucrats.
Méon and Sekkat (2005) summarize the arguments brought forward in favor of the
‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis. First, corruption can increase the speed with which bureau-
crats issue permits. Bribes therefore serve the function of giving incentives to bureaucrats by
speeding up this process (Leys 1965; Lui 1985). Méon and Sekkat cite Huntington (1968),
arguing that corruption speeds up railroad, utility, and industrial corporation construction,
resulting in higher growth.
Second, corruption might improve the quality of the civil service (Leys 1965; Bailey
1966). This is because inefficiently low wages are supplemented by graft, increasing the
attractiveness of jobs in the administration, in turn increasing the quality of civil servants.
Third, licenses might be allocated more efficiently when the most efficient firm can pay
the highest bribe (Leff 1964; Beck and Mahler 1986; Lien 1986).
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In summary, graft may be a hedge against bad public policy, in particular when institu-
tions are biased against entrepreneurship (Méon and Sekkat 2005).
The empirical literature on corruption has clearly established that it has a negative impact
on economic growth (e.g., Méon and Sekkat 2005). This seems to be inconsistent with the
‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis. However, as Méon and Sekkat (2005) point out, the negative
impact of corruption on growth, per se, is not inconsistent with the hypothesis. According
to the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis, corruption is not beneficial on average, but only when
regulation is excessive. Moreover, corruption might affect growth via various channels. For
example, corrupt officials might create distortions in the system in order to protect their
illegal income (Kurer 1993).2 Firms may be able to pay the highest bribe, and thus gain
a particular contract, just by compromising on the quality of the product (Rose-Ackerman
1997). Corruption might increase uncertainty, thereby increasing risks (Campos et al. 1999).
Economic growth would consequently deteriorate. Even if the negative effect of corruption
prevails overall, the true test is whether corruption helps in circumventing strict regulations.
Despite the overall impact of corruption on growth being negative, it may still promote
entrepreneurial activity which has been suppressed by rigid regulations.
Empirical evidence in support of the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis does already exist.
Evidence from Indonesia has already been alluded to in the introduction, for example (Vial
and Hanoteau 2010). According to Méon and Weill (2010), corruption reduces aggregate
efficiency in countries where institutions are effective, yet increases efficiency where insti-
tutions are ineffective.3 They distinguish between a weak and strong form of the hypothesis.
The weak form states that corruption is less damaging in countries with weak institutions,
while the strong form states that corruption is actually beneficial in a defective institutional
environment. Moreover, a cross-industry analysis by Klapper et al. (2006) provides prelim-
inary evidence that although regulatory barriers to firm entry do not adversely affect market
entry in corrupt countries, they do in less corrupt ones. This is exactly in line with the ‘grease
the wheels’ hypothesis: Less rigidity implies less “need” for corruption.
We therefore hypothesize:
Corruption increases firm entry rates in the presence of administrative barriers to en-
try.
3 Data
Our definition of entrepreneurship follows Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 46–47), defining
entrepreneurship as “the manifest ability and willingness of individuals” to perceive new
economic opportunities and seize them in the face of uncertainty in the market. We use
data provided by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The GEM dataset contains
survey-based annual data on early stage entrepreneurial activity for 43 countries since 2001.4
The surveys in the different countries generally are conducted by local universities. Repre-
sentative samples of at least 2,000 individuals are drawn annually for each country. The
2This is in line with the evidence in Anderson and Tverdova (2003), showing that people perceive more
corrupt political systems to be less efficient, on average.
3The efficiency-enhancing view of corruption has also been criticized however (see, e.g., Tanzi 1998; Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Kaufmann and Wei 2000). Kaufman and Wei (2000) report that multinational firms paying
more bribes also spend more time negotiating with foreign officials, working against the ‘grease the wheels’
hypothesis.
4The EIM Public Knowledge Web on SMEs (Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises) and Entrepreneurship
provides the dataset at http://data.ondernemerschap.nl/webintegraal/userif.aspx.
Public Choice (2013) 155:413–432 417
detailed list of partner institutions and the number of people interviewed, as well as more
information about these interviews are available in Minniti et al. (2005: 4–8, 57). We focus
on the percentage of the adult population who are ‘nascent’ entrepreneurs, defined as “those
individuals, between the ages of 18 and 64 years, who have taken some action toward cre-
ating a new business in the past year.5 To qualify for this category, individuals must also
expect to own a share of the business they are starting and the business must not have paid
any wages or salaries for more than three months” (Minniti et al. 2005: 16). The measure
is not ideal given that the stock of nascent entrepreneurs may be larger in countries where
stricter regulations lead to a longer procedure for starting a business. However, we control
for regulations in our analysis below. Also note that we replicate the analysis focusing on
firms that have existed for longer than three months but less than 42 months. Our results do
not depend on this choice.
In our subsequent empirical analysis, one central set of variables refers to regulation. As
we maintain a particular focus on regulations that apply to starting a business, we incorpo-
rate the following four variables into our empirical model (taken from the Doing Business
Dataset provided by the World Bank)6: The number of procedures required to start a new
business, the number of days required to start a new business, the costs of starting a new
business, and the minimum capital required to start a new business. The data are available
for 175 countries from 2003 onwards. The data focus on start-ups of limited liability compa-
nies which are owned by five local nationals and operate in the respective country’s largest
city. Procedures are defined as any interaction between the founders and external parties
necessary to complete the start-up process legally. The number of required procedures in
our sample ranges between 2 and 19. The days required to start a business captures the
median duration that business incorporation lawyers deem to be necessary to complete the
founding process. This measure ranges from 2 to 168. The start-up costs for a new business
are measured as a percentage of the respective country’s income per capita. Only official
costs are recorded, which guarantees that there is no direct relation to our corruption mea-
sures. The data range for this variable is 0 to 147. The minimum capital required to start a
business is the amount that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank before registering
the company. It is also measured as a percentage of the country’s income per capita, ranging
between 0–947.7
In addition to these four indices, we employ the sub-index on regulations from the Eco-
nomic Freedom Index developed by Gwartney and Lawson (2006). The index ranges from
0–10, with 10 indicating the highest value of economic freedom on the original scale. We re-
verse the index in order to ensure that our regulation measures all flow in the same direction,
i.e., higher numbers will now indicate stricter regulations. The index covers credit market
regulations, labor market regulations, and business regulations, employing a wide range of
variables (including some of the measures of regulations we use here).
To measure corruption, we employ two well-known and widely used indices. The first
indicator is provided by Transparency International (TI), ranging from 0 to 10. The second
index is from the World Bank’s ‘governance matters’ database (Kaufmann et al. 2006) with
5The exact question the respondent has to answer is: “Over the past twelve months have you done anything
to help start this new business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up team,
working on a business plan, beginning to save money, or any other activity that would help launch a business?”
(http://www.gemconsortium.org/download.asp?fid=410, accessed January 11, 2008).
6The data are available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
7Note that all regulation proxies are obtained by interviewing knowledgeable lawyers in each country. As we
are interested in the legal regulatory benchmark, this does not constitute a problem for our analysis.
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values between −2.51 and 1.71. We have rescaled the two indices, so that higher values
represent more corruption.
Our selection of control variables follows the previous literature. Among the economic
variables included in the vast majority of previous empirical specifications, GDP per capita
features most prominently. However, whether per capita GDP actually affects entrepreneur-
ship is still debatable. According to Ovaska and Sobel (2005), there is no significant impact
on the number of new enterprises per 1000 inhabitants. On the contrary, Parker and Rob-
son (2004) show that per capita GDP increases entrepreneurship. Others report that GDP
per capita reduces entrepreneurial activity (van Stel et al. 2003; Nooederhaven et al. 2004;
Bjørnskov and Foss 2008; Wennekers et al. 2007). Van Stel et al. (2003), however, find
nascent entrepreneurship to be more prevalent as the square of per capita GDP rises, sug-
gesting a u-shaped relationship. The u-shaped impact of per capita GDP on entrepreneurship
is confirmed in Verheul et al. (2006), with an implied turning point of around USD 26,000.
A potential explanation for this is that development might be accompanied by raising real
wages, in turn raising the opportunity costs of self-employment. Starting from a certain level
of development the service sector gains in importance, favoring entrepreneurship.
Another recurring theme in the literature is the hypothesis that post-Communist coun-
tries exhibit significantly lower levels of entrepreneurship while—at the same time—
experiencing faster growth rates, as private economic involvement has been suppressed
under communism. Empirical results on the impact of entrepreneurship are, however, not
entirely conclusive. Van Stel et al. (2003), Verheul et al. (2006), and Freytag and Thurik
(2007) report entrepreneurship to be less prevalent in former communist countries, while
Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) do not find a significant impact of (former) communism on total
entrepreneurial activity.
A glance at Appendix B shows that a wide array of other variables has been proposed but
there is by no means a consensus on the determinants of start-up activity. All variables, with
their sources, are presented in Appendix B, while Appendix C lists the countries included in
our sample. Note that not all variables used in the prior literature could be incorporated into
our panel set-up due to missing observations.
4 Do regulations prevent entry?
Desai et al. (2003) draw on regulatory data at the country level provided by the World Bank.
The World Bank measures several factors, including the number of procedures required
to start a company and those required to enforce a contract. According to the results in the
overall sample of Desai et al. entry barriers do not robustly affect nascent entrepreneurship—
a result also reported in van Stel et al. (2003). This is in contrast to Klapper et al. (2006), also
drawing from the World Bank database, who show that the costs of entry (measured in terms
of money outlays) reduce the fraction of new firms significantly. While these studies employ
different dependent variables—so their results cannot be compared directly—the difference
in regression outcomes might be due to the methodological refinement in Klapper et al.
(2006), taking the fraction of new firms entering the US market as proxy for ‘natural entry
barriers’ into account. Similarly, Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007) show that government
entry restrictions reduce entry in industries experiencing expansionary global demand and
technology shifts.
In their firm-level analysis for nine countries, Scarpetta et al. (2002) confirm the im-
portance of regulations for entrepreneurial outcomes. They show that entry rates are sig-
nificantly lower with stricter administrative regulations and stricter sector specific product
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market regulations. Ovaska and Sobel (2005) and Bjørnskov and Foss (2008) investigate the
impact of economic freedom on entrepreneurial activity which we argue is an alternative
measure for the role of regulations. Neither study finds strong evidence for the role of reg-
ulation. Employing the same data as Bjørnskov and Foss, Freytag and Thurik (2007) show
that the degree of regulation significantly diminishes entrepreneurial activity.
Turning to our institutional variable of primary interest—corruption—Desai et al. (2003)
show that firm entry rates are not significantly affected by corruption in both their overall
sample and the Eurozone, while corruption significantly reduces entry in Central and Eastern
European countries. Ovaska and Sobel (2005) find corruption to significantly reduce the
number of new enterprises (per 1000 capita).
Before we turn to testing whether corruption affects the impact of regulations on firm
entry, we analyze whether regulations robustly affect firm entry in the first place, using ex-
treme bounds analysis (EBA). The EBA has been proposed by Leamer (1983) and Levine
and Renelt (1992); it enables us to identify the explanatory variables that are related ro-
bustly to our entrepreneurial measure. EBA has been widely used in the existing literature
on economic growth. The main difficulty in this area of research—which also applies to the
research topic of this paper—is that the use of several different models may seem reasonable
given the data, yet yield different conclusions regarding the parameters of interest. The EBA
can be exemplified as follows. Equations of the following general form are estimated:
Y = βMM + βF F + βZZ + υ (1)
where Y is the dependent variable, M is a vector of commonly accepted explanatory vari-
ables and F is a vector containing the variables of interest. The vector Z contains up to three
possible additional explanatory variables (as in Levine and Renelt 1992) which, according
to the previous literature, are related to the dependent variable. The error term is υ . The
EBA test for a variable in F states that if the lower extreme bound for βF —i.e., the smallest
value for βF minus two standard deviations—is negative, while the upper extreme bound
for βF —i.e., the largest value for βF plus two standard deviations—is positive, the variable
F is not robustly related to Y .
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with certainty
that one model dominates all other possibilities in every dimension. In these circumstances,
it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to alternative
modelling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly that. Nev-
ertheless, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that the
test applied in the extreme bounds analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. If the
distribution of β has both positive and negative support, then we are bound to find at least
one regression in which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are
run. We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the
regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of
the coefficient for a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) suggestion to ana-
lyze the entire distribution. We report not only the unweighted parameter estimate of β and
its standard deviation, but also the unweighted cumulative distribution function (CDF), i.e.,
the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero.8 We base our
8In contrast to Sala-i-Martin, who suggests weighting results according to the goodness-of-fit of each regres-
sion, we use the unweighted mean parameter estimate of βF , mean standard error, and CDF. This is because
missing data pose a problem. The number of observations changes depending on which variables are included
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conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA. In line with Sala-i-Martin, a variable
is considered to be robustly related to nascent entrepreneurship if the CDF value is greater
than or equal to 0.9.9
Another potential objection to the EBA is that the initial partitions of variables in the M
and Z vectors are likely to be arbitrary. However, as pointed out by Temple (2000), there is
no reason why standard model selection procedures cannot be used in advance to identify
variables that are especially relevant.
Arguably, some variables included in the vast majority of previous empirical studies are
now commonly used. The variables most often used are per capita GDP and its square, and
a dummy for post-Communist countries.
In addition to these three variables, our EBA introduces the regulation measures above
one at a time; i.e., we run one EBA for each of our five measures of regulation. The remain-
ing variables, as described in Appendix B, are introduced in combinations of up to three
variables. We estimate the regressions using OLS with standard errors corrected for panel-
level heteroscedasticity (panel-corrected standard errors; see Beck and Katz 1996). We also
correct for first-order autocorrelation AR(1) of the error term within panels, restricting the
coefficients of the AR(1) process to be equal in all panels, as suggested by Beck and Katz
(1995). Moreover, we use the Prais-Winsten transformation, as this enables us to preserve
the first observation for each panel. As Beck and Katz (1995) argue, OLS with corrected
standard errors (as described above) is generally preferable to Feasible Generalized Least
Squares.10
The results of our final models reported below include 93 observations from 43 countries.
Among the sample, 14 countries enter with one observation, eight with two and 21 with
three. Most variables included in the regressions vary over time. Consequently, we prefer
panel models to approach the data. However, our results do not depend on this choice. When
we replicate the analysis using averages of all variables over the sample period and run a
pure cross-section analysis, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. They are available
on request.
Table 1 shows the results of the EBA. The first three rows report the results for the base
variables included in the M-vector of the EBA together with the number of procedures in
the F -vector, based on 4,691 regressions. As can be seen, GDP per capita and its square
easily pass Sala-i-Martin’s robustness criterion. The implied turning point of the u-shaped
relationship between income and entrepreneurial activity is approximately USD 27,000 per
capita. This finding is in line with Verheul et al. (2006), reporting the turning point to be
around USD 26,000.
Our results also confirm the relevance of communist heritage. Countries with a commu-
nist background have robustly lower levels of entrepreneurship (on average 5.5% over all
in each regression. Thus, the dataset essentially changes. In this context, Sturm and de Haan (2002) show that
the goodness-of-fit measure may not be a good indicator of the probability that a model is the true model, and
that the weights constructed in this way are not invariant to linear transformations of the dependent variable.
9An obvious alternative to the EBA is Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) developed by
Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). While this procedure has the advantage that no assumption has to be made about
the baseline model or the number of variables in the final model, it can be employed only for either a cross-
section or balanced panel setting. As our panel is unbalanced, we did a BACE analysis for the cross sections
of individual years among our sample. The results show similar patterns as the EBA but are less reliable due
to the small number of observations. The results are available on request.
10We have also estimated a generalized linear model using a generalized estimating equation (GEE) with an
AR(1) correlation structure. The results remain unchanged and are available on request.
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Table 1 Extreme bounds analysis results—dependent variable: nascent entrepreneurship
Variable Avg. beta Avg. S.E. %Sig CDF
Lagged GDP per capita −0.0007 0.0003 72.32 0.93
Lagged GDP per capita squared 1.37E–08 5.83E–09 73.23 0.94
Dummy for communist history −5.45 2.06 71.68 0.97
Procedures required to start a business −0.35 0.17 65.19 0.90
Minimum capital required to start a business −0.03 0.01 87.56 0.97
Days required to start a business −0.01 0.02 42.64 0.77
Costs of starting a business −0.08 0.07 60.08 0.68
Economic Freedom regulation sub-index −0.81 0.46 55.90 0.87
Notes: The results are based on 4,691 regressions. ‘Avg. beta’ reports the average coefficient while ‘Avg S.E.’
indicates the average standard error of all regressions. ‘%Sig’ shows the percentage of regressions in which
the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5% level at least. ‘CDF’ shows the (unweighted) mass
of the larger part of the distribution of the estimated coefficients (i.e., the value is always greater or equal
to 0.5). The criterion for a variable to be considered as robust is a value of 0.9 or above. The estimation
technique applied is OLS with heteroscedastic panel-corrected standard errors and an AR(1) error term that
is common across panels
regressions run). With respect to the variables previously proposed in the literature, the re-
sult of the EBA confirms the findings of earlier studies. As can be seen in Appendix B, only
three variables pass the CDF criterion of 0.9 or above: The average income tax, secondary
school enrolment, and the share of tax revenue in GDP. All other variables fail to meet the
robustness criterion.
Turning to our variables of primary interest, the results show that some regulations seem
to be robust determinants of entrepreneurship.11 Specifically, the number of procedures re-
quired to start a new business reduces entrepreneurial activity and thus constitutes a barrier
to entry. The minimum capital required to start a business also reduces the level of en-
trepreneurship. The number of days and the out-of-pocket costs required to start a business
do not pass the critical threshold, however, and thus cannot be considered to be robust deter-
minants of entrepreneurial activity. The same is true for the Economic Freedom sub-index
focusing on regulations.
As we pointed out earlier, however, the level of regulation is only part of the story. Even
if regulations do not prevent firm entry on average, this might be due to people offering
bribes to circumvent the regulations. In the absence of corruption, regulations might still be
harmful, even if on average they are not. We turn to this issue in the next section.
5 Does corruption ‘grease the wheels’ of entrepreneurship?
Table 2 presents evidence supporting the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis. Due to the high
correlation between the various measures of regulation, we include them in the base regres-
sion introduced above one at a time.12 The Transparency International index of corruption
11The EBA includes our measures of regulation one at the time to avoid multicollinearity.
12In Tables 2 and 3 we exclude the three additional variables that passed the EBA criterion as they decrease
the number of observations by approximately 1/3. To check for the robustness of our results, we replicated
all our regressions including the three variables. Our findings remain mostly unchanged.
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Table 2 Nascent entrepreneurship and corruption (Transparency International), 2003–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged GDP per capita −0.0007 −0.0008 −0.0007 −0.0007 −0.0007
(3.20)*** (3.18)*** (3.71)*** (3.46)*** (3.62)***
Lagged GDP per capita
squared
1.28E–08 1.63E–08 1.21E–08 1.42E–08 1.20E–08
(2.99)*** (3.29)*** (3.32)*** (3.28)*** (3.08)***
Dummy for communist
history
−5.6715 −5.5242 −5.3483 −6.3076 −6.2299
(3.50)*** (3.82)*** (4.27)*** (3.45)*** (4.18)***
Transparency
International corruption
−0.3095 −0.1119 −0.7443 −0.7679 −1.1236
(0.91) (0.32) (2.19)** (1.41) (1.69)*
Costs of starting a
business
−0.1804
(2.99)***
Corruption ∗ costs 0.0345
(2.80)***
Minimum capital required
to start a business
−0.0753
(4.39)***
Corruption ∗ capital
required
0.0106
(4.20)***
Days required to start a
business
−0.1149
(4.91)***
Corruption ∗ days 0.0246
(4.56)***
Procedures required to
start a business
−0.8919
(4.98)***
Corruption ∗ procedures 0.1441
(2.99)***
Economic Freedom
regulation sub-index
−1.5721
(2.80)***
Corruption ∗ regulation 0.2773
(1.65)*
Constant 13.6393 14.4107 14.8595 17.7612 18.7425
(4.55)*** (4.09)*** (5.90)*** (6.86)*** (6.89)***
M.E. of corruption cond.
on regulation (min)
−0.31 −0.11 −0.70** −0.48 −0.71*
M.E. of corruption cond.
on regulation (max)
4.22*** 9.94*** 3.00*** 1.68*** 0.46
Observations 93 91 93 93 122
Countries 43 42 43 43 42
Joint significance
(p-value) 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
R-squared 0.55 0.52 0.58 0.56 0.50
Notes: Corruption is measured on a scale between 0 and 10, with larger values indicating more corruption.
Higher values of all regulation variables indicate stricter regulation. Estimation is with heteroscedastic panel-
corrected standard errors OLS and common AR(1) error term across panels. Joint significance refers to the
p-value of a Wald test on corruption, the respective measure of regulation, and their interaction. Absolute
z-statistics are given in parentheses. M.E. of corruption cond. on regulation represents the marginal effect of
corruption conditional on the minimum (min) and maximum (max) of the regulation measure in the estimation
sample
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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enters the baseline regression separately and as an interaction with the respective measure of
regulation. Note that this setup does not imply that corruption and regulation cannot be de-
termined by the same set of variables in the long run. As one example, consider bureaucrats
introducing restrictions that enable them to extract bribes (e.g., Dreher and Siemers 2009).
However, what we ask here is a different question; namely, whether at a certain point in time
for any given level of regulations, the impact of these regulations is affected by the existing
level of corruption at the same point in time.
In all five regressions reported in Table 2, entrepreneurial activity decreases with (lagged)
GDP per capita and increases with its square, at the 1% level of significance.13 Also at the
1% level, less entrepreneurial activity is predicted in countries with communist histories.
The non-linear relationship between per capita GDP and nascent entrepreneurship implies
that an increase in per capita GDP by USD 1,000 reduces the number of new entrepreneurs
(relative to the adult population) by about 0.8% at the minimum (USD 261). At the mean of
USD 18,000, there is a 0.3% reduction, while at the maximum value of USD 39,000, start
up activity is increased by 0.3%. Post-Communist countries have between 5.3% and 6.3%
fewer new entrepreneurs.
However, the marginal effect of corruption and its level of significance have to be inter-
preted conditional on the interaction with the costs of starting a new business (see Friedrich
1982). The marginal effects at the minimum and maximum values are also shown in the
lower part of the table. At zero cost of starting a business, an increase in the corruption
index by one point reduces entrepreneurship by 0.31%.14 At its maximum of 131.3, a corre-
sponding increase in corruption increases entrepreneurship by 4.2%. While the conditional
effect is not significant at the minimum level of regulation, the effect is significant at the 1%
level for maximum regulation, lending support to the strong form of the ‘grease the wheels’
hypothesis. Our findings are also relevant economically. The sample average for firm start-
ups is 5.3% (see Appendix A). Thus, our results indicate that (in the presence of the most
stringent regulation) entrepreneurship may almost be doubled by an increase in corruption
(by one point on the ordinal scale).
Column 2 instead focuses on the minimum capital required to start a business. The re-
gression reveals a similar picture. At the 1% level of significance, stricter capital require-
ments reduce entrepreneurial activity, while the effect of corruption becomes more positive.
Again, the marginal effect is significant for the largest value of required capital (946.7%
of per capita GDP), but not when capital requirements are zero. An increase in the corrup-
tion index by one point does not affect entrepreneurship in the absence of regulations, but
increases entrepreneurship by almost 10% at the maximum level of regulation.
Turning to the numbers of days and procedures required to start a business, the results
are again similar. With a minimum of two days required, an increase in corruption by one
point reduces entrepreneurship by 0.7% (at the 5% level of significance). At the maximum
of 152 days, the increase in entrepreneurship amounts to 3% (column 3). The corresponding
increase in the maximum number of procedures (17) is 1.7%.
Column 5 reports the results for the Economic Freedom sub-index on regulations. At the
10% level of significance, corruption reduces entrepreneurship at the index minimum (1.5).
13Note that the results do not depend on the functional form of per capita GDP and its square. As potential
alternatives we have run regressions using log (GDP per capita) and its square, as well as GDP per capita
without its squared term (with and without taking logs).
14Note that the corruption index is to some extent ordinal rather than cardinal. It is therefore not obvious that
an increase from 1 to 2, for example, corresponds to an increase from 4 to 5. However, the corruption index is
usually treated as cardinal, assuming a linear scale of the ordinal index. See Mauro (1998), Treisman (2000),
Méon and Sekkat (2005), Méon and Weill (2010), among many others.
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Table 3 Nascent entrepreneurship and corruption (World Bank), 2003–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged GDP per capita −0.0006 −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0007
(2.65)*** (2.71)*** (3.35)*** (2.92)*** (4.18)***
Lagged GDP per capita
squared
1.08E–08 1.42E–08 1.13E–08 1.16E–08 1.30E–08
(2.50)** (2.83)*** (3.04)*** (2.75)*** (3.72)***
Dummy for communist
history
−5.5527 −5.5479 −5.3752 −6.1670 −6.6376
(3.55)*** (4.06)*** (4.30)*** (3.59)*** (4.19)***
World Bank Control of
Corruption
−0.1391 0.4267 −1.3242 −1.3416 −2.8858
(0.17) (0.46) (1.60) (1.05) (1.69)*
Costs of starting a
business
0.0129
(0.53)
Corruption ∗ costs 0.0753
(2.69)***
Minimum capital required
to start a business
−0.0176
(4.70)***
Corruption ∗ capital
required
0.0219
(4.97)***
Days required to start a
business
0.0286
(1.22)
Corruption ∗ days 0.0504
(4.13)***
Procedures required to
start a business
−0.0527
(0.24)
Corruption ∗ procedures 0.3323
(3.22)***
Economic Freedom
regulation sub-index
0.0687
(0.09)
Corruption ∗ regulation 0.8120
(1.88)*
Constant 11.5167 13.6233 10.4437 12.7767 12.1049
(4.87)*** (5.53)*** (6.67)*** (2.94)*** (2.63)***
M.E. of corruption cond.
on regulation (min)
−0.14 0.43 −1.22 −0.68 −1.67
M.E. of corruption cond.
on regulation (max)
9.75*** 21.17*** 6.33*** 4.31*** 1.66
Observations 93 91 93 93 96
Countries 43 42 43 43 42
Joint significance
(p-value)
0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
R-squared 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.50
Notes: Corruption is measured on a scale between −2.51 and 1.71, with larger values indicating more corrup-
tion. Higher values of all regulation variables indicate stricter regulation. Estimation is with heteroscedastic
panel-corrected standard errors OLS and common AR(1) error term across panels. Joint significance refers
to the p-value of a Wald test on corruption, the respective measure of regulation, and their interaction. Ab-
solute z-statistics are given in parentheses. M.E. of corruption cond. on regulation represents the marginal
effect of corruption conditional on the minimum (min) and maximum (max) of the regulation measure in the
estimation sample
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Regulations significantly reduce entrepreneurship, while corruption seems to function as
‘efficient grease’, significantly alleviating this impact.
Table 3 replicates the analysis with Kaufmann et al.’s (2006) corruption index. As can be
seen, the previous results are confirmed. In all regressions, the interaction term is significant
at the 10% level at least, with the expected positive coefficient. The marginal effects at
maximum regulation are significant at the 1% level in all but the final specification. The
results show that an increase in the corruption index by one point increases entrepreneurship
by 9.8% at the maximum costs level and by 21% for maximal capital requirements. The
corresponding values for the other measures of regulation are 6.3% (days required to start a
business) and 4.3% (procedures required to start a business).15
Figure 1 shows the results of the marginal effects of the two corruption measures, con-
ditional on the number of days required to start a new business.16 The left panel depicts the
results of the Transparency International measure, while the right panel shows the result of
the World Bank variable. In the figures, each dot represents one observation. The upper and
lower lines represent the 90 percent confidence interval. The results for both measures are
very similar. The ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a
new business. In the absence of regulation, corruption is harmful for new firms.17 Our results
thus provide support for the strong form of the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis according to
the definition of Méon and Weill (2010).
To test for robustness, we replicate our analysis replacing the dependent variable. As an
alternative, we use the total entrepreneurial activity index as our left-hand side variable. In
addition to nascent entrepreneurs, this variable also includes newly founded enterprises, i.e.,
firms that have existed for longer than three months but less than 42 months. Again the per-
centage of entrepreneurs relative to the adult population is measured. Using this alternative
dependent variable, we re-run the regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3. The results are ex-
tremely robust and yield almost identical implications. If anything, the relationship between
entrepreneurship, corruption and regulation becomes stronger. Overall, our central findings
prevail: The interaction between regulations and corruption remains significant even when
looking at the unconditional effect. All our findings with respect to the conditional effects
and their significance prevail without exception.18
We also test whether our results are driven by extreme values of either corruption or
regulation. We do so by re-running our regressions excluding the top and bottom 5%, both
15Potentially, strict regulations might drive entrepreneurs away from the official sector to the shadow econ-
omy (e.g., Antunes and de V. Cavalcanti 2007; Dreher et al. 2009). When corruption is a substitute for the
shadow economy, our results might be driven by the underground economy rather than reflecting the impact
of corruption per se. However, activities in the shadow economy might also be “taxed” by officials seeking
bribes. When we include a variable measuring the size of a country’s shadow economy (Schneider and Enste
2000; Schneider 2005a, 2005b) to our regressions, the results are not affected. The coefficient of the shadow
economy itself is insignificant in all specifications. This is in line with Méon et al. (2011), reporting a very
small effect of the shadow economy on aggregate efficiency.
16We also calculated the marginal effect of regulation conditional on corruption. We find that the marginal
effect of regulation increases with corruption. Specifically, regulatory barriers do not adversely affect entry
in corrupt countries, while they do in less corrupt ones. This is in line with Klapper et al. (2006). The figures
are available on request.
17For the sake of brevity, we suppress the graphs for the other regulation measures. They all exhibit the same
pattern and are available on request.
18As further test for robustness, we also replicated our results using the ICRG index of corruption. We do not
report the results, as this index captures the political risk involved in corruption rather than corruption per se.
The general results are very similar to those reported here.
426 Public Choice (2013) 155:413–432
Fig. 1 Marginal effect of corruption on nascent entrepreneurship. Notes: The figure visualizes the marginal
effects of corruption conditional on the number of days required to start a business. The results are based
on column (3) of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. The left panel displays the results for the Transparency In-
ternational index while the right panel utilizes the World Bank corruption index. Each dot represents one
observation. Furthermore, the 90% confidence interval is displayed
Table 4 Robustness test of the ‘grease the wheels’—effect
Transparency International World Bank
Costs of starting a business 0.100 0.093
Minimum capital required to start a business 0.004 0.003
Days required to start a business 0.101 0.045
Procedures required to start a business 0.083 0.073
Economic Freedom regulation sub-index 0.082 0.039
Notes: The table gives the results of the EBAs as discussed in Table 1. We report only the average p-values of
Wald tests that the three coefficients on our regulation measure, our corruption measure and the interaction
term between them are jointly equal to zero. Each entry in the table represents results from a separate EBA
based on 4,691 regressions. The control variables included are listed in Appendix B
jointly and separately, for the two measures. Doing so leaves our findings qualitatively un-
changed, with the exception of minimum capital requirements. We therefore conclude that
extreme observations are not the drivers of our results. In a similar vein, we re-run our anal-
ysis excluding former communist countries. This leaves our findings unaffected.
As our final test for robustness, we check whether our results depend on the choice of
control variables. We therefore replicate the EBA introduced above by including our mea-
sures of corruption and regulations, as well as the interaction term between the two. The
results of this analysis are summarized in Table 4. The table shows the average p-value of
the Wald test for joint significance for the three ‘greasing the wheels’ variables. Again, we
calculate separate EBAs for each measure of regulation and each measure of corruption. The
top left entry (costs of starting a business/Transparency International) gives the average p-
value for the joint significance test on costs, corruption, and their interaction based on 4,691
regressions. As can be seen, these three coefficients are significantly different from zero at
the 10% level, on average. The table shows that this is true for all our combinations, except
for the effect of days required to start a business on the Transparency International index,
which is marginally insignificant.
To summarize, we find strong evidence in favor of the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.
While corruption hardly affects entrepreneurship when the economy is not heavily regu-
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lated, corruption increases entrepreneurial activity when regulations abound. We also find
some evidence that—while strict regulations reduce entrepreneurial activity in the absence
of corruption—this negative impact becomes less pronounced with more corruption.
6 Conclusion
The paper provides two contributions to the literature. First, and instrumental to our main
question of interest, we test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our
results show that some regulations indeed matter for entrepreneurial activity. Specifically,
we find that if more procedures are required to start a business and minimal capital require-
ments are higher, they will be detrimental to entrepreneurship on average. Regarding control
variables typically included in similar studies, we find the expected u-shaped relationship
between GDP per capita and entrepreneurship. Moreover, countries with communist back-
grounds have significantly fewer entrepreneurs. Testing for the robustness of the numerous
additional determinants of entrepreneurship proposed in the previous literature, we find the
average income tax rate, secondary school enrolment and the share of tax revenue in GDP
to be robustly related to entrepreneurial activity.
As our main contribution, we tested whether corruption can be an efficient ‘grease’,
reducing the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated
economies. Arguably, this is a more effective way of testing the ‘grease the wheels’ hy-
pothesis than using economic growth rates, as has been done elsewhere. Clearly the impact
of circumventing regulations on economic growth can only be an indirect one, thus it is not
surprising that most studies focusing on growth did not find much evidence in favor of a
beneficial impact of corruption. We employ a more direct test, focusing on the variable that
regulations to market entry are most likely to affect: The number of new entrepreneurs (in
percent of the total adult population). Our empirical analysis for a maximum of 43 countries
over the 2003–2005 period shows that corruption can indeed be beneficial. At the maxi-
mum level of regulation in our sample of countries, public corruption increases private en-
trepreneurial activity significantly. As such, corruption might be viewed as being beneficial
rather than harmful. This conclusion, however, warrants some caution. First, larger numbers
of entrepreneurs entering the market are not necessarily beneficial to society. If regulations
effectively block the entry of firms that are likely to fail, or those that supply goods and
services that the government wants to prevent from being offered to the market, then more
entrepreneurial activity might be socially wasteful. We cannot test those alternatives with
our data.
Second, our analysis neglects potential long-term feedbacks from corruption to regula-
tions. While it seems reasonable to assume that corruption and regulations are both exoge-
nous to the entrepreneur’s decision to enter the market in the short run, this might not be
true in the longer term. There is some evidence that frictions are introduced to allow corrupt
officials to extract rents. According to Myrdal (1986), corrupt officials cause delays so that
they gain the opportunity to ask for bribes. Edwards (1999) and DeLong and Eichengreen
(2002) argue that controls might breed corruption. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) emphasize
that the imposition of capital controls for example makes it easier to collect bribes. Dreher
and Siemers (2009) show that more corruption is associated with more restrictions on the
capital account, while Djankov et al. (2002) find that entry regulations are more stringent as
corruption among public officials becomes wider and deeper.
When regulations are introduced by corrupt officials to allow for the extraction of bribes,
the level of regulation in a country will rise in the long-run as a consequence of corruption.
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As regulations prevent firms from entering the market and corruption can be used to alle-
viate this impact, we cannot know which effect on the allocation of resources dominates.
While the potential endogeneity of regulation and governmental corruption does not pose
a problem for identifying the mechanism of interest in this paper, studying the longer-term
consequences of regulation and corruption would require endogenizing a country’s level of
corruption. We leave this for future research.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommer-
cial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A: Sources and descriptive statistics for the key variables
Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Nascent entrepreneurship Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor
5.285 3.967 0.5 31.4
GDP per capita (constant
2000$)
World Bank (2006) 13091.7 11136.1 219.6 39004.9
Dummy for communist
history
0.131 0.337 0 1
Procedures required to
start a business
Doing Business 8.647 3.905 2 19
Days required to start a
business
Doing Business 38.649 34.040 2 168
Costs of starting a
business
Doing Business 18.982 25.843 0 146.5
Minimum capital required
to start a business
Doing Business 47.632 103.105 0 946.7
Economic Freedom
regulation sub-index
Gwartney and Lawson
(2006)
4.089 0.934 1.4 7.3
Transparency
International corruption
Transparency
International
5.100 2.431 0 9.6
World Bank corruption Kaufmann et al. (2006) −0.205 1.094 −2.51 1.71
Appendix B: Control variables included in the extreme bounds analysis
Variable Proposed by Source CDF
Average income tax (combined
central and sub-central government
taxes)
Parker and Robson (2004) OECD (2007) 0.94
Average of Net Replacement Rates
over 60 months of unemployment,
with social assistance
Parker and Robson (2004),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
OECD (2007) 0.85
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(Continued)
Variable Proposed by Source CDF
Average of Net Replacement Rates
over 60 months of unemployment,
without social assistance
Parker and Robson (2004),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
OECD (2007) 0.63
Bank nonperforming loans to total
(%)
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) World Bank (2006) 0.54
Domestic credit to private sector
(% of GDP)
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) World Bank (2006) 0.73
Employer social security
contributions
Parker and Robson (2004) OECD (2007) 0.53
Employment in services (% of total
employment)
Verheul et al. (2006),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.66
Female employment share (females
employed/total females, both
15–64)
Noorderhaven et al. (2004),
Verheul et al. (2006),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
OECD (2007) 0.59
Female participation rate (female
labor force/female population, both
15–64)
Parker and Robson (2004) OECD (2007) 0.65
Foreign direct investment, inflows
(% of GDP)
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) World Bank (2006) 0.53
GDP per capita growth (annual %) van Stel et al. (2003) World Bank (2006) 0.59
Health expenditure, total (% of
GDP)
Freytag and Thurik (2007) World Bank (2006) 0.82
Industry, value added (annual
% growth)
Scarpetta et al. (2002) World Bank (2006) 0.64
Inflation, consumer prices
(annual %)
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) World Bank (2006) 0.75
Internet users (per 1,000 people) van Stel et al. (2003) World Bank (2006) 0.52
Labor force, female (% of total) Noorderhaven et al. (2004),
Verheul et al. (2006),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.53
Life expectancy at birth, total
(years)
Freytag and Thurik (2007) World Bank (2006) 0.53
Long term interest rate Wennekers et al. (2007) OECD (2007) 0.64
Population density (people per sq.
km)
Noorderhaven et al. (2004),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.84
Research and development
expenditure (% of GDP)
Verheul et al. (2006) World Bank (2006) 0.77
School enrollment, secondary
(% gross)
Uhlaner and Thurik (2007),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.90
School enrollment, tertiary
(% gross)
Uhlaner and Thurik (2007),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.64
Services, etc., value added (% of
GDP)
Parker and Robson (2004) World Bank (2006) 0.69
Share of 25–39 year olds in group
of 25–64
Wennekers et al. (2007) OECD (2007) 0.67
Social contributions (% of revenue) van Stel et al. (2003) World Bank (2006) 0.87
Statutory corporate income tax
rates (top marginal rate if
applicable)
van Stel et al. (2003) OECD (2007) 0.88
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(Continued)
Variable Proposed by Source CDF
Tax revenue (% of GDP) van Stel et al. (2003) World Bank (2006) 0.91
Taxes on income, profits and
capital gains (% of revenue)
van Stel et al. (2003),
Parker and Robson (2004)
World Bank (2006) 0.89
Taxes on international trade (% of
revenue)
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) World Bank (2006) 0.82
Unemployment, total (% of total
labor force)
van Stel et al. (2003),
Noorderhaven et al. (2004),
Parker and Robson (2004),
Verheul et al. (2006),
Wennekers et al. (2007)
World Bank (2006) 0.74
Appendix C: List of countries included
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portu-
gal, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, The Nether-
lands, Uganda, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela.
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